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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Section 78-2-1.6 Utah
Code Annotated
Court has

(1953 as amended) which provides that the Supreme

appellate

jurisdiction

over

fl

(j) appeals

from any

court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction".

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
When attending a Sherifffs sale pursuant to a judicial
mortgage foreclosure, can the judgment debtor request that the
property be sold in
an

lots or parcels.

The standard for review is

"independent determination of the law".
If a request to sell property in lots or parcels was made

a judgment debtor but was ignored by the sheriff conducting the
sale, did the court err in failing to set aside the sheriff1 s
sale.

The standard for review is "abuse of discretion".
3

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section

78-37-1,

Utah

Code

Annotated

(1953

as

amended)

provides:
There can be one action for the recovery of any
debt or the enforcement of any right secured solely
by mortgage upon real estate which action must be
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due,
with costs and disbursements, and the sale of
mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to
satisfy said amount and accruing costs and
directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the same
according to the provisions of law relating to
sales on execution, and a special execution or
order of sale shall be issued for that purpose.
Rule 69 (e)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
CONDUCT OF SALE.
All sales of property under
execution must be made at auction to the highest
bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and 5
o'clock p.m.
After sufficient property has been
sold to satisfy the execution no more shall be sold.
Neither the officer holding the execution nor his
deputy shall become a purchaser or be interested in
any purchase at such sale.
When the sale is of
personal property capable of manual delivery it must
be within view of those who attend the sale, and it
must be sold in such parcels as are likely to bring
the highest price;
and when the sale is of real
property, consisting of several known lots or
parcels, they must be sold separately1 or when a
portion of such real property is claimed by a third
person, and he requires it to be sold separately,
such portion must be thus sold.
All sales of real
property, must be made at the courthouse of the
county in which the property, or some part thereof,
is situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the
sale, may also direct the order in which the
property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such
property consists of several known lots or parcels,
or of articles which can be sold to advantage
separately, and the officer must follow such
directions.
4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This

case

Spendlove

involves

a judicial

foreclosure

(hereinafter

Spendlove)

attempted

wherein

to

Winferd

foreclose

the

interest of persons, who had interests junior to his own including
the interest of appellants Jodel Ventures Trust, Dell F. Hatch,
Trustee, Corey S. Mogelberg, Bernice Lehman, Encinosa Enterprises,
Dell Hatch, Trustee, Dell Ransom Hatch.
Course of Proceedings
1.

On January 19, 1990 the court entered a Nunc Pro Tunc

Default Judgment in favor of Spendlove and against appellants
pursuant to Spendlove's claim for judicial mortgage foreclosure•
In addition, the court executed an Order of Sale on November 15,
1990, in which it instructed the Washington County Sheriff to sell
the foreclosed property, at public auction.
2.

The sheriff's sale was conducted on December 21, 1990

pursuant to notice.

The property was sold as one parcel to

Spendlove for less than the amount of the judgment.
3.

On March 26, 1991, a Motion to Set Aside the Sale was

filed by appellants.

Spendlove filed a response to said motion

and cross-motion asking the court to uphold the sale and enter a
deficiency judgment.
4.

At a subsequent hearing the court denied

appellants

motion to set aside, affirmed the sheriffs sale and entered the
deficiency judgment.
5

5.

This appeal was timely

filed seeking a review of the

district court's decision to affirm the sheriffs sale and enter
the deficiency judgment.
Disposition in Lower Court
The district court denied appellants motion to set aside the
sheriffs' sale and entered the deficiency judgment requested by
Spendlove.
Statement of Facts
1.

On January 19, 1990 the court entered a Nunc Pro Tunc

Default Judgment

in

favor

of Spendlove

and

against

appellants

pursuant to Spendlove's claim for judicial mortgage foreclosure.
In addition, the court executed an Order of Sale on November 15,
1990, in which it instructed the Washington County Sheriff to sell
the foreclosed property, at public auction.
2.

The sheriff's sale was conducted on December 21, 1990

pursuant to notice.
3.
himself

At the time of the sale, appellant Dell Hatch, acting for
and

on

behalf

of

the

other

appellants,

appeared

and

demanded that the property be sold by parcels pursuant to Section
57-1-27 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
6.
sheriff

Appellee
not

to

Spendlove

sell

and

the property

his
in

counsel
parcels

instructed
as

requested

the
by

appellants, but to rather sell the property as one block.
7.

The property in question had been previously divided into

parcels.
6

8.
block.

The sheriff then proceeded to sell the property as one
The property was purchased by appellee Spendlove for less

than the amount of the default judgement.
9.

On March 26, 1991, a Motion to Set Aside the Sale was

filed by appellants.

Spendlove filed a response to said motion

and cross-motion asking the court to uphold the sale and enter a
deficiency judgment.
10.

At a subsequent hearing the court denied appellants

motion to set asidef affirmed the sheriffs sale and entered the
deficiency judgment.
11.

This appeal was timely filed seeking a review of the

district court1 s decision to affirm the sheriffs sale and enter
the deficiency judgment.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

A sheriff conducting a sale of real property, pursuant to

a judicial foreclosure should sell said property in lots or
parcels if said property has been divided

into known lots or

parcels or if he is instructed to do so by a judgment debtor.
2.

In the event that a request to sell in lots or parcels is

refused by a sheriff the district court should exercise it's
powers of equity and issue and order setting aside the sale (upon
filing of a timely request) and direct that the property be sold
in lots or parcels as specified by the judgment debtor.

7

ARGUMENT
THE REAL PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS NOT
SOLD PURSUANT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
AND AS SUCH THE SALE IS INVALID
Appellants

contend

that the

sheriff

improperly

sold

the

property in question because he failed to sell the property in
lots or parcels as required by statute.

Section 78-37-1 Utah Code

Annotated (1953 as amended) states that sheriff's sales regarding
mortgage foreclosures are to be conducted in the same manner as
sales on writs of execution.

In pertinent part, the statute

states:
"Judgment shall be given adjudging the amount due
with costs and disbursements and the sale of the
mortgaged property or some part thereof, to satisfy
said amount and accruing costs, and directing the
sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to
the provisions of law relating to sales on
execution ...".
Rule

69 of the Utah

Rules

of Civil

Procedure addresses the

procedures for conducting the sale on a writ of execution.
dealing with a sale of real property consisting of

When

several known

lots or parcels, Rule 69(e)(3) states that "when the sale is of
real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels, they
must be sold separately...".

A .plain reading of this provision

would indicate that if property is known to consist of several
lots, the sheriff must sell said lots individually even if no
request is made by other persons.

In this case the lots were

listed separately on county tax records and were each owned by a
different

appellant.

Accordingly,
8

the

sheriff

should

have

automatically
sherifffs

sold

failure

the
to

property
follow

the

in

individual

statutory

lots.

The

requirements

of

conducting a Scile renders the sale invalid.
Even if we assume, for purposes of argument, that Rule 69
does not require the sheriff to automatically sell the property in
lots, the same rule would still require that the property be sold
in lots if the judgment debtor is present at the sale and makes an
express direction to sell the property in lots.

Rule 69(e)(3)

states in pertinent part:
"The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may
also direct the order in which the property, real
or personal , shall be sold, when such property
consists of several known lots or parcels, or of
articles which can be sold to advantage separately,
and the officer must follow such directions."
In the case at hand, the judgment debtor was present and did
demand that the property be sold in lots.

Once again, a plain

reading of the statute would suggest that if such a demand is made
the officer must sell the property as directed by the judgment
debtor.

The

failure of the

sheriff

to conduct the sale in

accordance with the statutory requirements should render the sale
void.
Finally,

appellants

discretion for the

contend

that

it

was

an

abuse

of

district court to fail to set aside the sale.

In the case of Mower v. Bohmke 337 P. 2d 429, (Utah 1959) the court
addressed it's policy regarding judicial sales.

In reviewing the

propriety of a judicial sale the court suggested that

a court

equity did have equitable powers to overturn a judicial sale but
9

would only do so if the sale was "manifestly unfair".
cases

have

unfairness
extremes

suggested
standard

where

that

the

the

in

order

sale would

interest

of

to

meet

have to

the

debtor

Subsequent

this

result
were

manifest
in unjust

sacrificed.

Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Reality Services Inc. 743 P.2d
1158 (Utah 1987).
part,

because

of

This rather strict standard is justified, in
Utah's

rather

lengthy

redemption

period.

Ironically, the manifest unfairness in this case relates to the
redemption period of the judgment debtor.
With regard to the redemption issue, if the subject property
is sold as one parcel, the judgment debtors would have to redeem
the property as one parcel by paying the entire price offered by
Spendlove at the sale.

This means that all owners of the various

lots would have to redeem in order for any one owner to be able to
regain his property.
unable

If one of the owners, of one of the lots is

or unwilling to pay his share of the

redemption price the

others would have to cover his share of the redemption price or be
precluded from recovering their own property.

However, if the

property had been sold as separate parcels, the parcels could
individually be redeemed by the owner of each parcel.

Since the

lots were owned individually by each of the appellants, (not as
joint owners of the entire parcel) it would seem manifestly unfair
to treat them

as one unit

redemption right.

for purposes

of exercising their

To do so, would effectively deprive them of any

redemption right whatsoever and results in the kind of sacrifice
of

debtors

interest

that

was
10

contemplated

by

the

court

in

Concepts.

Concepts Inc. v. First Security Reality Inc. 74 3 P. 2d

1158, 1160 (Utah 1987)
In

addition,

the

judgment

debtors,

sought

to

have

the

property sold in parcels in order to obtain the highest price for
the property.

The debtor believed that by selling the property

as single building

lots, some persons would

purchasing a single lot.

be

interested in

By selling the lots as one parcel

Spendlove Wcis able to eliminate from bidding all persons except
developers that might be interested in developing or owning all of
the lots.
Appellants contend that both of these reasons demonstrate
that the sale was manifestly unfair to appellants and as such the
court should have exercised it's equitable power to set aside the
sheriffs' sale.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument the court should determine
that the sheriffs' sale was invalid as a matter of law and enter
an order setting aside the sheriffs' sale.

In the alternative the

court should find that the district court abused it's discretion
in failing to set aside the sheriffs1 sale and remand the case to
the

district

court

with

specific

directions

for

proceedings.
Dated this

18th day of December, 1991.

Stanford Nielson
^ _ ^
Attorney for Appellants"
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the 18th day of December, 1991, I caused
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief to be mailed
to:

Ronald W, Thompson
Barbara G. Hjelle
Michael A. Day
Thompson, Hughes & Reber
148 East Tabernacle
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ADDENDUM

THOMPSON, HUGHES & REBER
Ronald W. Thompson (Bar No. 3242)
Barbara G. H^elle (Bar No. 4597)
Michael A. Day (Bar No. 5463)
Attorney for Defendant Spendlove
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 673-4892
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLAY T. BEESLEY and LaJUANA BEESLEY,
Plaintiffs,
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT
vs.
DELL RANSOM HATCH, DELL F. HATCH, JOAN
HATCH, JODEL VENTURES TRUST, ENCINOSA
ENTERPRISES, BERNICE LEHMAN, COREY S.
MOGELBERG, and WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Defendants.
WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
CLAY T. BEESLEY and LaJUANA BEESLEY,
Plaintiffs,
WINFERD SPENDLOVE,
Cross-Claimant,
vs.
JODEL VENTURES TRUST, DELL F. HATCH,
Trustee, COREY S. MOGELBERG, BERNICE
LEHMAN, ENCINOSA ENTERPRISES, DELL
HATCH, Trustee, DELL RANSOM HATCH and
DEE SUPPLY, INC.,
Cross-Defendant.

Civil No. 88-224*

2
THIS

MATTER

having

come before

the

Court

on Cross-

Claimant's motion for the entry of a deficiency judgment and for
additional attorney's fees, and Cross-Claimant having appeared by
and through his attorney Michael A. Day, of Thompson, Hughes &
Reber, and Cross-Defendants having appeared through their attorney
Stanford Nielson, the Court having considered the arguments of
counsel and the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale executed by Cory C.
Pulsipher, Deputy Sheriff of Washington County, State of Utah, and
the affidavit of Michael A. Day, together with the pleadings on
file herein, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that CrossClaimant

take

judgment

against

Cross-Defendant

Jodel

Ventures

Trust, Dell F. Hatch, Trustee, for the amount still owing CrossClaimant after sale of the property by the sheriff and application
of the proceeds of such sale, together with interest thereon at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from and after the date of
sale, nunc pro tunc as of December 21, 1990, pursuant to Title 15,
Utah Code Annotated, and together with additional attorney's fees
as follows, to-wit:
Deficiency
Interest to 3/12/91
Attorney's fees
TOTAL DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT

$ 54,561.76
1,452.33
1,750.00
$ 57,764.09

The total deficiency judgment shall bear interest at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum as provided by law from the
date of this judgment until paid, together with after-accruing
costs of court and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Cross-

3
Claimant in collecting the same.
DATED this

day of May, 1991,

(_j2^£<*--

J/y PHILIP EVES
ISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Approved as to form:

"Stanford- Nl^lson
Attorney for Dell Ransom Hatch,
Dell F. Hatch, Joan Hatch, Jodel
Ventures Trust, Encinosa Enterprises,
Bernice Lehman, and Corey S.
Mogelberg
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT was placed

in the

United States mail at St, George, Utah, with first-class postage
thereon fully prepaid on the

day of May, 1991, addressed as

follows:
Mr. Winferd Spendlove
1295 South 180 West
Hurricane, Utah
84737

Mr. Stanford Nielson
3760 S. Highland Dr., #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Mr. Dell F. Hatch, Trustee
Jodel Ventures Trust
P.O. Box 643
Bullhead City, Arizona
86442

Mr. Hans Q. Chamberlain
Mr. Colin R. Winchester
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah
84720

Mr. Clay T. Beesley
Mrs. LaJuana Beesley
2085 South 700 West
Box 130-4
Hurricane, Utah
84737
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MOTION FOR DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO SET ASIDE SHERIFF'S SALE
MINUTE ENTRY

MINUTE ENTRY

Mr. Day and Mr. Neilson present and

rebuttal. The Court heard and stated this

Mr. Nielson heard as to Motion to Set

was a foreclosure sale not an execution

Aside Deficiency Judgment with Mr. Day

sale and the Court directed the sale of

heard in opposition to same. Both counsel

the property in one parcel not in separate

stipulate that there is a deficiency

parcels and the issue was never raised as

judgment and the Sherifffs sale was valid

to separate parcels. This issue

Mr. Dell F. Hatch sworn and testified

have been raised prior to the Sheriff sale.

under direct examination bv Mr. Neilson
and no cross by Mr. Day, witness steps
down.

Counsel heard in response and
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